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Abstract—The paper presents some of the results obtained
within the ongoing project related with functional require-
ments and design models of secure workstation for special ap-
plications (SWSA). SWSA project is directed toward the com-
bination of the existing hardware and software virtualization
with cryptography and identiﬁcation technologies to ensure
the security of multilevel classiﬁed data by means of some for-
mal methods. In the paper the requirements for SWSA, its
hardware and software architecture, selected security solution
for data processing and utilized approach to designing secure
software are presented. The novel method for secure software
design employs dedicated tools to verify the conﬁdentiality and
the integrity of data using Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML)
models. In general, the UML security models are embedded
in and simulated with the system architecture models, thus
the security problems in SWSA can be detected early during
the software design. The application of UML topology models
enables also to verify the fundamental requirement for MLS
systems, namely the hardware isolation of subjects from dif-
ferent security domains.
Keywords—cryptographic protection, multilevel security, soft-
ware design, UML, virtualization.
1. Introduction
The issue of building a reliable Specialized Computer Sys-
tems (SCS), which are processing data with diﬀerent levels
of sensitivity becomes particularly topical, especially in re-
gard to the SCS applications in government institutions,
military or ﬁnancial. The problem of processing informa-
tion with diﬀerent levels of sensitivity has been extensively
studied since the early 70s of the twentieth century [1]–[3].
Formal base of multilevel security (MLS) are presented in
the work of Bell-LaPadula (B-LP) [2]. In the computerized
system, which uses a multilevel security, it is necessary to
determine users authorization (so-called security clearance)
who work with classiﬁed information in accordance with
the requirements of the missions’ tasks (the rule of “neces-
sary knowledge”) and the classiﬁcation of information, due
to the required level of protection.
To ensure the conﬁdentiality and integrity of information,
there are often used models of B-LP, Biba [4], Clark-
Wilson [5] which provide mandatory access control (MAC)
entity (called subject) to the resource (called object). The
mandatory access control of any entity (this can be a pro-
cess) to resource (e.g., data ﬁle, the communication chan-
nel, etc.) is assigned to a security context. In order to de-
termine entitlements in systems using MAC are designed
labels, which contain the security context in particular
pairs: <sensitivity level, information category>. On the
set of labels of protected data partial order relation is de-
ﬁned, and to subjects and objects must be used invariable
rules [3], [4], [6], among others, a rule prohibiting “writ-
ing down”, a rule prohibiting “reading up”. It should be
noted that implementing the systems and networks’ set of
rules (that is, building a reliable system based solely on op-
erating systems with multilevel protection of information)
in the computer is diﬃcult and expensive. This is mainly
because of diﬃculties to build a reliable reference monitor
and the diﬃculty of ensuring that in the system will not be
the “leak” of sensitive information due to the possibility of
the so-called covert communication channels in operating
system [7].
Another approach to the construction of a centralized (ie, no
distributed) computer system with multi-level security is to
develop software in the virtualization technology [8]–[10]
for the separation of independent security domains, called
the Multiple Independent Levels of Security. Such soft-
ware should allow for the simultaneous launch of several
speciﬁc instances of operating systems on one PC (such as
a workstation or server) designed to process data of diﬀer-
ent classiﬁcation levels (e.g., public and proprietary), or to
process the data in diﬀerent systems for which there need
for separation of data.
This approach has become today entirely possible thanks
to the availability of solutions with virtualization hardware
support in modern Intel and AMD processors, and de-
veloped software packages (COTS type) for virtualization.
Now, widely used are the extension of the x86 architec-
ture, designed to support hardware virtualization [8]–[10]
as Intel Virtualization Technology in particular VTx, VTD
for x86 processors, VTi for Intel IA-64 (Itanium), and AMD
Virtualization (AMD-V) for 64-bit x86 processors from
AMD. These technologies also allow (in addition to hard-
ware support emulation of the virtual machine) for building
a trusted environment in which a separate virtual machines
(which are separate security domains) are performed in sep-
arated hardware partitions. The implementing of this type
of design of MLS system requires the integration of avail-
able virtualization technology (software and hardware), ap-
plication of formal methods for both ensuring and control
of the conﬁdentiality and integrity of data, and techniques
for user authentication. A natural way to build such sys-
tems is component approach, which assumes the use of
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ready and available hardware components and software, in
particular virtualization packages available as open source
like Xen [11] and KVM [12].
The paper presents the requirements for a Secure Worksta-
tion for Special Applications (SWSA), its hardware and
software architecture, selected security solution for data
processing and utilized approach to designing secure soft-
ware. The developed method of manufacturing the type
systems of MLS, which is deﬁned as a Model Driven Mul-
tilevel Security (MDmls) method, organizes the process of
producing the SCS of MLS type and is derived from the
concept of Model Driven Architecture (MDA) [13], [14]
and Model Driven Development (MDD) [15], [16]. A sim-
ilar approach to build secure software is presented in [15],
but it does not include multilevel protection issues. The
integration of security models with models of systems de-
scribed in UML enables the simulation which allows to
verify the eﬀectiveness of security the designed software
of SCS type MLS at the stage of modeling.
2. SWSA Requirements
The technical solutions should be designed and prepared for
strictly deﬁned applications. This paradigm is particularly
important when considering the high assurance equipment.
The invalid deﬁnition of SWSA designation could lead to
a signiﬁcant increase in costs, realization time and the com-
plexity of security functions, and as a result to reduce the
chances of achieving the adequate quality, reliability and
security assurance of the product. The ﬁrst task in the
project was therefore to consider the technology limits im-
posed by legal requirements and then to select the suitable
usage scenarios.
2.1. SWSA Usage Scenarios
The most important discriminating factors for SWSA us-
age scenarios were adopted ad hoc, just to make the legal
analysis of usage scenarios more thorough and systematic:
– diﬀering classiﬁcation levels of information which is
processed within individual virtual machines: single-
level, multi-level, and international multi-level, while
the latter is not considered in the subsequent analysis;
– the number of users accessing SWSA categorized as
user-less and multi-user; in user-less applications the
Administrator (ADM) and the Security Oﬃcer (SO)
only have access to the system, while in multi-
user applications there are some additional users of
the workstation with access rights other than ADM
and SO;
– the connectivity of SWSA, which is recognized as:
stand-alone, local-area and wide-area; the stand-
alone SWSA has no access to any ICT networks; the
locally connected SWSA accesses a local area net-
work within a single security zone, while the wide-
area connectivity implies that SWSA is connected to
a wide area networks and may access multiple ICT
networks located in diﬀerent security zones.
The combinations of the aforementioned factors lead to dif-
ferent legal implications for related classes of SWSA usage
scenarios. The analysis of these combinations allowed to
arrange them in order of the increasing complexity of the
most important implementations, or to be more speciﬁc, the
anticipated complexity of obtaining the security approval
during the accreditation:
– single-level, multi-user and wide-area class of usage
scenarios. The workstation in these scenarios is con-
nected to several networks processing information of
the same security classiﬁcation, but diﬀering cate-
gories; an example of such application is the mutual
access of SWSA to the networks of R&D and ac-
counting departments;
– multi-level, multi-user, and stand-alone class of us-
age scenarios; example of such applications may be
the stand-alone trusted workstation in classiﬁed in-
formation storage facility;
– multi-level, user-less, and wide-area class of usage
scenarios, in which the SWSA could be the base
platform for ICT security assurance solutions, e.g., to
transfer the data between systems processing the in-
formation of diﬀering levels of classiﬁcation;
– multi-level, multi-user and wide-area class of usage
scenarios; the security requirements and limitations
for such applications are the most demanding when
compared to any other class of applications; in gen-
eral, these requirements and limitations regard the
challenging threats for the conﬁdentiality of infor-
mation in multi-level, multi-user and distributed en-
vironments.
2.2. Legal Regulations and SWSA
The main conclusion of a survey on national regulations and
guidelines in ICT security is the observation that these le-
gal documents apply mainly to the “hardware” level of ICT,
and do not contain any speciﬁc requirements for the virtu-
alization. The lack of necessary regulations does not imply,
however, the application of virtualization in the classiﬁed
information systems is forbidden due to the well-known
security principle of “what is not allowed – it is forbid-
den”. While some changes of the legal status could help
to implement such solutions, there is always the opportu-
nity to obtain the approval for such applications within the
system accreditation procedures. The next statements are
the fundamental security terms and requirements for SWSA
identiﬁed during the analysis of the Polish Classiﬁed Infor-
mation Protection Act [17], regulations and security author-
ities guidelines.
The most important requirement is that the SWSA must
ensure the protection adequate to the highest level of clas-
siﬁcation of the information processed within VMs. It is
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assumed that due to the anticipated classiﬁcation level such
a security assurance of SWSA should to be evaluated on at
least 4th level (EAL4) in accordance to Common Criteria
methodology. It was also found that at least the compart-
mented security mode is adequate for applications demand-
ing the security functions of SWSA. As a result, SWSA
should provide the technical support for strict mandatory
access control (MAC) policies.
In the wide-area applications, in which the distinct VMs
are connected to local area networks of cooperating enti-
ties, SWSA should comply with the security requirements
for system interconnection. In particular, SWSA must pro-
vide security measures to absolutely protect the conﬁden-
tiality of the information. These security functions should
be accompanied by proof of a controlled separation of SOS
including the covert channels analysis.
The wide-area application imposes some speciﬁc require-
ments on the formal labeling and registration of each work-
station and individual VMs. These terms are in a sense
analogous to the deployment of the remote IT terminal
within the security zone, which is not controlled by the
system owner. The host system of SWSA comprising of
the computer, hyper-visor and the host operating system
should be labeled and registered as a part of ICT system in
the deployment place. VMs, which are remotely attached
to other ICT systems via wide area connections, should be
labeled and registered as agreed between the cooperating
entities and the system owners. The agreements may vary
with respect to the ownership, administration duties and
responsibilities, and even liabilities regarding VM. SWSA
should therefore provide some technical and operational
support regarding the registration and labeling of virtual
machines as well as their backups.
The Classiﬁed Information Protection Act imposes also the
obligations to implement the security measures to protect
ICT equipments against the compromising electromagnetic
emanations. In general, these obligations apply to the hard-
ware part of the workstation, namely chassis, signal and
power supply lines. In particular, there are some speciﬁc
requirements on the separation of the signal and supply
lines belonging to either the unclassiﬁed (BLACK) or clas-
siﬁed (RED) parts of ICT system. However, these con-
ditions do not imply any separation requirements for the
parts of SWSA which process the classiﬁed information of
diﬀerent security level. It is therefore assumed that SWSA
should host only either the RED or the BLACK VMs.
2.3. Specification of Functional Requirements
In the SWSA environment can distinguish three types of
actors: the system administrator, security oﬃcer (here-
inafter SO), SOS user (hereinafter user) (Fig. 1).
Security oﬃcer with the administrator and others are devel-
oping special security requirements of the system (SSRS),
and safe operation procedures (SOP). The SSRS is identi-
ﬁng levels of security virtual machines installed in SWSA
and permissions for actors (users). SL involves clause of
Fig. 1. General scheme of the basic elements of SWSA archi-
tecture.
information authorized to process and its set of informa-
tion categories (range). Each level is described (according
to Bell-LaPadula model) by a pair <k, c> where k ∈ K
is the clause of information (K = {public, proprietary,
conﬁdential, secret}), and c ∈ C is a subset of the cate-
gories of information c = {c1, c2, . . . , cL}. For example,
C = {PD, GR, OS, DP, . . .}, where the symbols PD, GR,
OS, and DP denote the personal data, guidance resources,
the operational situation, the data for purposes.
The clauses are ordered (from minor to major),
∀i=(1,...,4) ki ≤ ki+1, but the categories are not. Security
levels can be compared. For example, SLa =<ka,Ca >
and SLb =<kb,Cb>, if the following conditions: kb ≤ ka
and Cb ⊆ Ca, then SLb ≤ SLa (SLa level is higher or
equal than the SLb). Let SLb =<con f idential, {PD,GR}>,
and SLa =< secret, {PD, GR, OS}>, then we have
a SLb ≤ SLa, because according to satisfy the fol-
lowing: con f idential < secret and {PD, GR} ⊆ {PD,
GR, OS}. Please note also that not all pairs of security
levels are comparable. This leads to the use of the concept
of lattice of security levels.
The security system according to Bell-LaPadula model
is satisﬁed if the following axioms are preserved: se-
curity simple, stars, stability, security discretionary, non-
availability of inactive object, the independence of the ini-
tial state. These axioms have been adopted in all models
using mandatory access control to information. The ful-
ﬁllment of these axioms ensures that classiﬁed information
in the system will not be available for those who did not
receive proper authorization. SO deﬁnes security attributes
of SOSk (k = 1,2, . . . ,n) existing in the SWSA, such as their
clauses and classes of applications, manages the database
of users and their security credentials, identifying opportu-
nities to access resources for each of the domains. Access
permissions to the domains are determined by security la-
bels. Security oﬃcer gets access to the labels management
and control of their allocation in the system through Virtual
Machine Monitor (VMM).
The administrator performs backups of host machines and
virtual machines, creates a new account for SSO users,
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Fig. 2. Functional requirements for administration subsystem
of SWSA.
creates and modiﬁes the conﬁguration of virtual machines
(Fig. 2). In the model of requirements for VMM (Fig. 1),
the user limits his task to run the SSO.
3. Architecture SWSA
It is essential for creating complex computer systems plays
an architecture solution. With regard to the SWSA to be
particularly important to recognize the hardware and soft-
ware elements of the architecture due to their signiﬁcant
impact on the security of the system.
3.1. Hardware Architecture
It is assumed the use of components that enable hardware
support for security technology and hardware virtualization
support. To isolate the separate domains containing isolated
environments implementing Trusted Execution Technology
(TXT) will be used, while an important role in ensuring
the integrity of the SWSA will play a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) that allows the secure creation and storage
encryption keys.
Fig. 3. Block diagram of a system based on the Xeon processor
5600 series.
Because of the applied approach (using ready components),
hardware design limits itself to the conﬁguration that de-
scribes the characteristics of the applied solution. Proposed
hardware architecture of SWSA is based on a machine
with an Intel Westmere with dual-processor Xeon E5630
model (Fig. 3), each of which contains the four proces-
sor cores. This architecture gives the possibility of sharing
the responsibilities between the various hardware compo-
nents, allows for the separation of the ﬂow of information
within the hardware and allows the separation of partitions
with distinct security domains. Block diagram of a sys-
tem based on the Xeon processor 5600 series is shown
in Fig. 3. When designing the hardware architecture used
UML with using topological models which construction
is supported by a CASE environment – Rational Software
Architect (RSA).
3.2. Software Architecture
In the architecture SWSA can be distinguished the follow-
ing elements: the trusted system platform (TSP) and ex-
ecutable special versions of operating systems SOS. The
general scheme of architecture SWSA is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. General scheme of the basic elements of SWSA archi-
tecture.
The essential elements of an architecture SWSA are the SSP
and virtual machinesVMi which we write in the form of the
formula: SWSA := SSP+{VMi}, where i = {1, . . . n}. SSP
consists of: kernel of Linux operating system, its extension
in the form of a component (SELinux), and monitor vir-
tual machines (VMM), TSP = Linux Kernel + SELinux +
+ VMM. TSP allows you to run and supervise activities
of specialized operating systems SOSi (i = 1, 2, . . . n) and
acting on their environment, application programs {AP},
forming a virtual machine, VMi := SOSi +{AP}i.
The VMM is a key component of the SWSA, responsi-
ble for running virtual machines in accordance with de-
ﬁned security rules (using the hardware support) and their
switching to ensure the separation of resources. It was as-
sumed that the proposed VMM software should make it
possible to simultaneously launch several (of many possi-
ble) instances of special versions of operating systems SOSi
on a single computer with the provision of: access control,
separation of resources, cryptographic protection, and strict
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control of data ﬂow. The number of instances of virtual
machines that is run, depends on the conﬁguration of the
station, in particular on the number of physical processors
and cores. For example (Fig. 4), SSP supervises n virtual
machines, among which operate both VM1 and VM2, and
accordingly, on the VM1 is active {AP}1 (which is repre-
sented as VM1 →{AP}1), on VM2 is active {AP}2 (which
is represented as VM2 →{AP}2). The VMM manages ac-
cess to both virtual machines SOSi, as well as to hardware
resources (physical and virtualized).
The project also assumes that the instance of a special ver-
sion of the operating system (SOS) working within a vir-
tual machine (VM) is a separate Security domain (SD),
VMi [SSOi] = SDi. In each of the domains the processing
of the data qualiﬁed to diﬀerent security levels is allowed.
Figure 4 shows two security domains, and each of them
associated with one virtual machine.
It is worth noting that both the operating system kernel, as
well as special versions of operating systems in terms of
the project are ready components and their design will be
limited only to the speciﬁcations of their interfaces and con-
ﬁguration descriptions. Interfaces were described in UML,
and the conﬁgurations on the topological diagrams. In this
area, the CASE tools (RSA) were used.
4. Cryptographic Protection of SWSA
Even in the simplest systems and applications, there are
many places where the potential attack is possible, and their
number is limited only by the inventiveness of the attacker.
There are three basic areas in which information is exposed
to capture:
– when you enter (e.g., keyboard);
– during transmission (e.g, via a local network or the
Internet);
– when writing (e.g., on ﬁxed and removable media).
In the area of interest of presented data protection solution,
the SWSA belongs to the third area, including security of
data stored on ﬁxed and removable storage media.
The elaborated solution is assumed, among other things,
the exchange of data between the internal, to the operat-
ing system, medium (ie hard drive), and external media
(e.g., hard drive or Flash RAM) connected to the system
via USB. However, the data exchanging between external
media (e.g., Flash RAM) which are connected to the SWSA
by USB is not possible. The process of securing the ex-
change of data using removable media should satisfy the
following functional requirements:
– should be implemented in a manner transparent to
the user;
– should not cause any noticeable to the user loads of
the operating system;
– should not have a signiﬁcant impact on the speed of
read and write data onto data media;
– should allow to perform any operation allowed for
data storage media, such as volume, surface checking
for errors, and defragment the disk-based data.
These requirements force the use of the process of data
security, a dedicated module (driver) for the operating sys-
tem running at the kernel level. Schematic diagram of the
developed solution is shown in Fig. 5. A detailed descrip-
tion of the method of securing removable media is given
in [18].
Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of securing of data stored on an
external drive.
It is assumed that the elements involved in the process
of securing stored data are divided into two groups: the
internal and external components. The division has been
completed, taking as its criterion, the relationship between
the elements and the operating system installed on com-
puter. The internal components (Fig. 5) includes both the
hardware in a computer’s hard drive, and software mod-
ules: the driver, .DLL library that provides the functional-
ity of the implemented encryption algorithms, module of
session key generation, and a database of public keys of
users. External components (Fig. 5) connected to a com-
puter via USB include hardware components in the form of
Flash RAM, and the user identiﬁcation card in the form of
a smart card.
The process of writing (encryption) of data transferred to
external media requires the user to identify the recipient of
such a data. The process of data recording is initialized
by the user (operator) currently logged on the system. The
logged user may also be the recipient of the data. During
the reading operations (decryption) the ﬁle, the operator
is the recipient. For each of the saved ﬁle, the signature
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is created that contains the information needed to decrypt
the ﬁle. A signature is cryptographically protected, and
could be read only by the recipient of the ﬁle.
5. The Method of SWSA Software
Design
The key problem of SWSA software design boils down to
building the trusted system platform (TSP) which includes:
operating system kernel, virtual machines manager (VMM),
and running special versions of operating systems. It is
worth noting that both the operating system kernel, and
special versions of operating systems in terms of the carried
out project are ready components, and the project will be
limited only to the speciﬁcations of their interfaces and
conﬁguration descriptions. Interfaces would be described
in UML and the conﬁgurations on topological diagrams.
The essential complexity of software design is thus reduced
to the construction of VMM virtual machines manager
(Fig. 4), which will be responsible for its own implementa-
tion of the Xen hypervisor virtualization component, but it
is worth noting that the work includes the implementation
of its own unique solutions in this scope, in particular, it
provides multilevel security policies.
In the process of development of VMM software, a new
method of software design of MLS-type systems called
MDmls was proposed [19] which is based on MDD (Model
Driven Development) approach [13]. The method intended
for designing specialized MLS-type systems contains, in
particular, its basic processes, domain languages used,
stages and development environment. The essence of the
MDmls method is the integration of MLS security mod-
els with system design models expressed in UML-based
language. Such integrated models with both a concrete
notation and abstract syntax are called security design
models [20].
In the MDmls method, the activities concerning of do-
main modeling languages DSM are essential. The construc-
tion of a new class of Domain Speciﬁc Language requires
a metamodel created, because only on this basis the proﬁle
can be deﬁned. The metamodel formalizes the structure
of models, as well as scenarios, which represent possible
instances of SWSA.
From the perspective of project management, the transi-
tion to the implementation stage takes place after complet-
ing modeling, which we build the next release of “tested
models” in an incremental and agile way. Implementation,
however, is carried out, but only after delivering the ﬁ-
nal version of the system model, and considerably makes
up the result of automatic transformation of models into
system code and descriptions of the required conﬁguration.
Therefore, the method assumes that all developed, in accor-
dance with MDA, models are combined with transforma-
tions: speed manual or automatic (model-to-model [M2M],
model-to-text [M2T]).
In this scope of design process, it is proposed to use
the extended UML language with the so-called topolog-
ical models [16], [21]. The creation of these models is
supported by the CASE environment – Rational Soft-
ware Architect (RSA). The IBM RSA ver. 8.0 extended
environment was used with the Rational Software Ar-
chitect Simulation Toolkit, with support for UML Ac-
tion Language (UAL), which provides a subset of the
speciﬁcations described in OMG with technologies fUML
and ALF (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. The outline of environment for development of SWSA
software [19].
The description of methods on how to validate the design
solutions, speciﬁcation of threat scenarios, and veriﬁcation
of the models in the RSA environment the subject of an-
other publication.
Thanks to the integration of security models with the
MLS-type SCS models (described in UML), in the pro-
posed method of designing MDmls, the possibility of simu-
lating models is obtained, which allows veriﬁcation of many
security problems of the designed system at the modeling
stage. Using the model topology also allows the (physical)
study of separating data processing processes belonging to
diﬀerent domains of security, which is one of the elements
of verifying MLS-type systems. Additionally, the topology
model enables deﬁning the SWSA conﬁguration, and then
validate the rules concerning the exhaustion of station phys-
ical resources (resulting from its current conﬁguration).
6. Summary
The main goal of the project that is to develop a secure
environment for processing data of diﬀerent classiﬁcation
levels on the same physical machine is achieved by inte-
gration of existing hardware and software virtualization,
cryptography and identiﬁcation technologies to ensure the
security of multilevel classiﬁed data by means of some for-
mal methods and components approach to provide diﬀerent
virtual machines with either Linux or Windows systems for
each security level. The SWSA project is currently in the
validation phase and its results are quite promising.
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